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Introduction  
 
Radicalization and violent extremism had been on the political agenda for some time when, in 
2014, a national coordinator was appointed in Sweden. The coordinator’s job was to help 
improve cooperation between key actors at national, regional and local levels in their work to 
 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Malin E. Wimelius, Email: malin.wimelius@umu.se, Department of Political 
Science, Umeå University, 901 87 Umeå, Sweden. 
Abstract 
Radicalization and violent extremism are pressing issues on the Swedish political 
agenda. The local level has been identified as pivotal when it comes to preventive 
work and local public actors are encouraged to cooperate with civil society in 
efforts to promote local resilience. However, the Swedish debate on the role of 
civil society organizations (CSOs) and faith based organizations (FBOs) in 
resilience building and prevention is heated. Based on 14 interviews with 
representatives for secular, Christian and Muslim CSOs and FBOs, we have 
explored and analysed how they perceive their role in resilience building and 
preventive work. We have asked how they interpret local resilience against 
radicalization and violent extremism and what they think is needed in order to 
promote it. Findings are mirrored against a recent literature review on local 
resilience. In the interviews, there is a strong emphasis on work to strengthen 
social support networks, enhance community resources and build collective 
identity. In relation to the literature review, there are significant similarities with 
how resilience is defined and said to be promoted. 
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safeguard democracy. In official Swedish discourse, violent extremism is defined as 
movements, ideologies or environments that do not accept democracy and promote violence 
for the purpose of achieving ideological goals (SOU 2017:110: 3). Three environments have 
been identified: right wing, left wing and Islamist violent extremists. According to the 
Swedish Security Service (Säpo), the Islamist environment is the most dangerous one (Säpo, 
2018: 62) and, provides our focus here.  
As in many other countries, the local level has been identified as crucial for detecting 
and preventing radicalization and violent extremism. In Sweden, the local authorities (in 290 
municipalities) have been under pressure to appoint coordinators, develop action plans and 
increase local resilience – and thereby prevent – radicalization and violent extremism. There 
has been and still is strong agreement in both policy and research circles that success with 
regard to prevention hinges upon effective cooperation between public actors on the one hand 
and between public actors, civil society organizations (CSOs) and faith based organizations 
(FBOs) on the other (Ju 2014: 18; SOU 2017: 110). However, during the last couple of years, 
there has been a heated debate in Sweden on the role of CSOs and FBOs in resilience building 
and preventive work. State funding of these organizations has been critically discussed in 
public debates and in Official Reports of the Swedish Government (Statens Offentliga 
Utredningar, SOU). At the core of this debate lies a suspicion that some (mostly Muslim) 
CSOs and FBOs pay lip service to democracy and human rights in order to a qualify for 
funding (Hedin, 2015; Ismail, 2016; Helmerson, 2018). Simultaneously and paradoxically, 
CSOs and FBOs are also referred to as resources in preventive work. Compared to public 
actors, they are often said to enjoy higher levels of trust in local communities and therefore 
better equipped to approach sensitive issues in constructive ways (SOU 2017: 110).  
A growing literature addresses the role of CSOs and FBOs in resilience building and 
preventive work but often without engaging directly with such organizations for the purpose 
of mapping and analysing their experiences and perspectives. Our aim is therefore to explore 
and analyse how Swedish CSOs and FBOs perceive their role in resilience building and 
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preventive work, especially against the backdrop of the debate on their role. From their 
perspective, what is local resilience against radicalization and violent extremism and what do 
they think is needed in order to promote it? We mirror findings against a recently completed 
and published literature review on what local resilience to radicalization is, and how it can be 
promoted. Fourteen interviews were carried out with representatives for CSOs and FBOs on 
the national level and in two local contexts in Sweden. These interviews were conducted 
within the realms of a research project on radicalization, Islamist violent extremism and local 
resilience.  
The paper is organized as follows: first, we provide a short background to key events 
and developments in Sweden. This is followed by a section on previous research on the role 
of CSOs and FBOs in resilience building and preventive work. Third, we present findings 
from the literature review of local resilience to radicalization. The main results from that 
review are used as a lens through which the interview material is analysed. In the fourth 
section, we describe our research design and the interview method. We then turn to the 
interviews themselves and present findings supported by quotes. Results and conclusions are 
discussed in the final section. 
 
Background  
 
As noted in the introduction, the national coordinator identified resilience building and 
preventive work at the local level as pivotal. First, all municipalities were encouraged to 
appoint local coordinators. This was followed by a recommendation to assess to what extent 
the three identified extremist environments were active in each local context and on that basis, 
draw up action plans against violent extremism. Such plans were described as means through 
which cooperation between relevant actors could be promoted and resilience building and 
preventive work take concrete form (Ju 2014: 18). However, local work on resilience building 
and prevention is far from straightforward. Competing explanations as to why people 
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radicalize (Bjorgo, 2011; Borum, 2012 and Pisoiu, 2013), difficulties in understanding exactly 
what resilience means, as well as tension between social policy and security policy 
perspectives, make such work demanding for many local actors. It is, in other words, hard for 
local decision-makers to know what resilience building should look like in practice. Should 
local work focus on identifying risk factors, individuals and environments or concentrate on 
general protective factors instead? Unsurprisingly, previous research has shown that local 
action plans in Sweden display a tension between risk and protection i.e. between security 
policy and social policy perspectives on radicalization and violent extremism (SKL, 2017). 
Municipalities struggle to find a balance between on the one hand working with protection on 
a general level and on the other selecting and targeting certain groups displaying risk factors, 
no matter how difficult it is to decide what these really are. Related to this, there is a 
discussion on the role of civil society organizations and faith based organizations. State 
funding lies at the heart of this debate. 
CSOs and FBOs can apply for state funding, for instance at the Swedish Agency for 
Youth and Civil society (Myndigheten för ungdoms- och civilsamhällefrågor, MUCF). FBOs 
can also apply for funding from the Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities 
(Myndigheten för stöd till trossamfunden, SST). Between 2016 and 2018, MUCF supported 
approximately 50 projects against violent extremism and funds amounted to well over 20 
million SEK (MUCF, 2019). The agency has been criticized in the media, but also by other 
agencies, for not being able to assess and evaluate to what extent actors and projects actually 
do comply with democratic values and norms (Statskontoret, 2017).  
The Swedish Government decides which faith communities are allowed state funding 
and the Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities allocates assigned means to those 
communities. State funding was introduced in 1971 but does not include the Church of 
Sweden, which is funded mainly through church tax. State funding aims to “enable 
congregations to work actively with a long-term focus on worship, education, and spiritual 
and pastoral care” (The Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities, 2019). In 2017, 
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well over 40 communities, six of them Muslim, received support. Critics, among them some 
politicians, have argued that faith communities should receive no state support whatsoever. 
According to them, Sweden is a secular country that should not spend tax money on religious 
communities. Critics have also claimed that some of the Muslim communities are linked with 
the Muslim Brotherhood and embrace values contrary to democracy and gender equality 
(Åberg, 2017; Skogkär, 2018). As far as the latter is concerned, a couple of reports on the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Sweden and on Islamist attempts to influence the Swedish public 
debate, commissioned by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, have been in the public 
eye (see Norrell, Carlbom & Durrani, 2016 and Carlbom, 2018). Although one of the reports 
is careful to stress that only a minority of Swedish Muslims support and are influenced by 
Muslim Brotherhood ideas, state funding is problematized (Carlbom, 2018). For some critics, 
Islamist organizations “take the back door” into Swedish society and actively seek to infiltrate 
both civil society and political parties (Gudmundson, 2018).  
The Act on support to religious communities stipulates the criteria FBOs have to meet 
in order to be funded. Partly because of the debate on state funding, it has recently been 
reviewed by an inquiry (SOU 2018:18). Among other things, the inquiry concluded that it was 
unclear how the democracy criterion in the act should be interpreted. It therefore suggested a 
new one “worded in such a way as to exclude religious communities that act in contravention 
of fundamental values in Swedish society” (SOU 2018: 18: 47). 
 
Previous research on the role of CSOs and FBOs in resilience building and preventive 
work 
 
Research on the role of civil society in resilience building and preventive work is growing. 
The consequences of the war on terror for civil society, especially in the global South have 
been mapped, described and analysed in numerous case studies. In the global North, literature 
has discussed cooperation between public actors and civil society, highlighted the dangers of 
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securitization in the wake of preventive programs and addressed the role of civil society. 
Prevention is also a key issue among policy makers and there is an abundance of workshop, 
policy paper and handbook materials available. It is our impression that these are sometimes, 
but not always, interwoven with research. Studies that build on interviews with 
representatives for CSOs and FBOs in countries like Sweden are relatively few. In this 
section, we give a brief thematic but by no means exhaustive review of previous research. 
When it comes to the consequences of the war on terror for civil society, Cortright and 
colleagues (2008) conclude that repressive counterterrorism measures have eroded human 
rights in many countries and that:  
“Overly restrictive security policies have contributed to a climate of suspicion 
towards nongovernmental groups, particularly those who challenge social 
exclusion and unequal power relations. Many of the organizations that work 
against extremism by promoting human rights and development are themselves 
being labelled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to operate.” 
(Cortright, Lopez, Millar & Gerber-Stellingwerf, 2008, v).  
 
Views about how civil society can contribute to preventive work are thus linked to ideas about 
what it is that causes radicalization in the first place. Although there is agreement that 
processes are unique, that factors vary and can include a mix of personal character traits and 
societal, religious, political, economic and cultural aspects, many policy makers and 
researchers seem to agree that it is important to address structural conditions. Conditions 
believed to give rise to violent extremism in the global South are armed conflict, oppression, 
poverty and human rights abuses (Cortright et al, 2008: 1). Civil society is often said to play 
an “indispensable role” in addressing these root causes as CSOs give voice to grievances, 
promote political accountability, produce trust, support the rights of citizens and facilitate 
dialogue between public actors and citizens (van Ginkel, 2012: 7; Cortright et al, 2008: 2). In 
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other words, they do important work but not necessarily within programs explicitly designed 
to address violent extremism.   
In a study of CSOs in Indonesia, Sumpter (2017) shows that these often step in where 
the government fails to do so and draw on local contacts, knowledge and a greater level of 
trust among community members in their work to prevent violent extremism. CSOs work in 
schools and universities, they engage with youth in activities and discussions to promote 
tolerance and pluralism and they work in prisons. Interviews show that CSO representatives 
often think that the very label CVE (countering violent extremism) is unhelpful and part of 
securitization. 
Cooperation and securitization, two recurrent themes in research on the role of CSOs 
and FBOs in Western countries, are often discussed in relation to preventive programs that 
have been launched in for instance the UK, Australia and the US. Effective interventions 
designed for specific local circumstances in tandem with cooperation between local 
communities, local police, policy makers and public actors such as teachers and social 
workers have been seen as key to success (Skiple, 2018; Thompson & Bucerius, 2017; Hertz, 
2016, see also Stephens & Sieckelinck, 2019). Skiple analyses local implementation of an 
educational program in Sweden, the Tolerance Project. She shows both that front-line 
professionals problematize racism and intolerance in different ways and that they do not make 
a clear distinction between preventing radicalization and fostering democratic citizens.  
Many community-based preventive programs have been criticized, however. Several 
studies from the UK show how Muslim communities have felt stigmatized by preventive 
strategies, projects and programs (Institute of Race Relations, 2010; Stevens, 2011; O’Toole, 
Nilsson DeHanas & Modood, 2012; Thomas, 2016). Community-based approaches and 
cooperation with CSOs and FBOs may thus be complicated and difficult. However, research 
from the UK also shows that there is an “appetite for engagement” among young people in 
Muslim communities (Pilkington, 2018). Commenting on policy shifts in the country and 
stressing the need for a social approach to radicalization, Pilkington writes that: 
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“emphasis towards community engagement in counter-terrorism policy offer an 
opportunity – for communities to stand up to stigmatisation, engage in dialogue 
and to show their strength and resilience not only in picking up the pieces after 
terrorist attacks but in safe-guarding each other in a way that makes their 
occurrence less likely.” (Pilkington, 2018).  
 
In other research, calls are made for combining security-focused approaches and social 
approaches to radicalization by employing hard, soft and smart power policies. While hard 
power policy instruments are available only to the police and security agencies, soft power 
instruments – often described as addressing root causes of radicalization, supporting dialogue 
and building trust – can be employed also by “NGOs, corporations, institutions and 
transnational networks” (Aly, Balbi & Jacques, 2015: 5). Smart power is achieved through an 
“integrated strategy” and draws on a combination of hard and soft instruments but rests upon 
a legitimacy derived from activities in civil society. According to Aly and colleagues, violent 
extremism is a “social issue with security implications” rather than the other way around (Aly 
et al, 2015: 9). 
According to Mandaville and Nozell (2017), interest in and space for the inclusion of 
religious actors in work to prevent violent extremism has grown over the past couple of years 
(Mandaville & Nozell, 2017: 1). The role of religion in relation to violent extremism is 
debated but scholars often agree that establishing causal links is difficult. All religions are 
interpreted in different ways; where some find inspiration and support for violence, others 
find solace and tolerance. Some scholars also suggest that being firmly anchored in religious 
beliefs can reduce the likelihood of accepting and adopting extremist rhetoric and worldviews 
(Mandaville & Nozell, 2017: 1-3).  
In policy terms, there has been a lot of discussion on how to engage religious actors 
and institutions in preventive work. In terms of what religious organisations, actors and 
communities can do, structural conditions are again brought to the fore (Mandaville & Nozell, 
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2017: 11). As shown earlier, however, engaging with religious communities remains 
controversial in some circles and questions that concern credibility, funding and ideology are 
often raised (RAN LOCAL, 2016; Said & Fouad, 2018: 8). In the EU, the US and in Sweden 
there is a number of policy papers, reports on best practices and guidebooks available on how 
to build trust, initiate dialogue and find ways to establish partnerships with various 
communities (see for instance OSCE, 2018; MUCF, 2017 and the Change Institute, 2008). In 
one report, it is said that: 
“Establishing a relationship with communities who feel targeted by authorities is 
difficult and time-consuming; nonetheless, this constitutes a first step in 
advancing community engagement, resilience and the willingness to deal with 
issues such as polarisation and radicalisation.” (RAN LOCAL and YF&C, 2018: 
5).  
 
Some of these reports, papers and guidebooks seem to be outcomes of workshops involving 
for instance local coordinators against radicalization and violent extremism. The extent to 
which recommendations are based on empirical studies is difficult to say, but the number of 
references to such studies is small (see also Aly et al, 2015: 7).  
It seems clear that CSOs and FBOs are considered important in relation to 
radicalization and violent extremism, but for different reasons. To some states and 
governments, their work for human rights and democracy becomes suspicious and the label 
“extremist” ascribed to anyone or anything that might appear critical to government policy. In 
other contexts, CSOs and FBOs are perceived as resources and valued for their abilities to 
build trust. The quote above highlights the issue of resilience; we address research on local 
resilience in the next section as we outline our analytical framework and ask how Swedish 
CSOs and FBOs think about their role in resilience building and preventive work. 
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What is local resilience and how can it be promoted?  
 
In our previous review on local resilience to radicalization (Wimelius, Eriksson, Kinsman, 
Strandh & Ghazinour, 2018) we synthesized findings from literatures within the fields of 
public health, social work, crisis management and community policing to identify factors 
there argued as promoting local resilience. In this study, we use those previous findings as a 
lens through which we analyse experiences and perceptions among representatives for CBOs 
and FBOs. 
Within the field of public health, resilience is broadly understood as the capacity of a 
community to bounce back from a disaster or trauma (Norris, Stevens, Phefferbaum, Wyche 
& Phefferbaum, 2008), or to withstand or recover from adversity (Plough, Fielding, Chandra, 
Williams, Eisenman, Wells, Law, Fogleman & Magaña, 2013). Further, the public health 
literature on resilience emphasizes the need to assess community strengths based on existing 
capacities in the community, rather than simply focusing on vulnerabilities (Plough et al, 
2013). In line with this, the public health literature emphasizes the need for building 
community partnerships, engaging with community organisations, and coordinating training 
to promote community resilience (Centres for disease control and prevention, 2011).  
Within the social work literature, the concept of resilience is mainly used as a 
theoretical tool for guiding strength-based approaches in interventions at both individual and 
community levels (Pinkerton & Dolan, 2007). As such, resilience in social work implies 
trying to mobilize protective factors and promoting local capacity by focusing on community 
strengths rather than focusing on risks (Broadsky & Bennett Cattaneo, 2013; Kulkami, 
Kennedy & Lewis, 2010). Promoting community resources such as a collective identity, sense 
of hope, agency, altruism, trust and security, are ways of promoting community resilience 
according to the social work literature; these resources must be integrated within existing 
community networks, however (Sousa, Haj-Yahia, Feldman & Lee, 2013).  
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Within crisis management, resilience is broadly understood as a dynamic process 
rather than an outcome, not least in relation to natural disasters. This dynamic process is 
described as containing  an ability to withstand stress without losing function (robustness); an 
ability to retain functional requirements during disruption (redundancy); an ability to supply 
resources to maintain priorities (resourcefulness); and an ability to avoiding further disruption 
and losses (rapidity) (Bruneau & Reinhorn, 2007). In order to promote these abilities, the 
literature emphasizes the need for building trust in public institutions, endorsing a sense of 
belonging as well as relying on and making use of existing social networks (Cutter, Ash & 
Emrich, 2016). Finally, the literature within community policing uses resilience as a concept 
describing the ability of a community to stick together and help itself, why communication, 
cohesion and cooperation are key (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014). In 
order to promote resilience, the literature emphasizes the need for strengthening community 
safety, which in turn requires close communication with community members. 
As illustrated above, and concluded in our review (Wimelius et al, 2018) there is clear 
agreement between literatures on the definition of local resilience and how it can be 
promoted. In summary, local resilience is seen as: a dynamic process (rather than a fixed 
state) with a clear focus on strengths rather than problems and risks; a capacity in a local 
community in which cooperation, social networks and community resources are key; a 
normative concept, something to strive for, and; a framework for guiding interventions. In 
addition, there is agreement between literatures that local resilience can be promoted by:  
- Strengthening social support networks;  
- Collaborating with community organizations;  
- Enhancing community resources;  
- Increasing community safety;  
- Building collective identity based on hope, agency, altruism, cohesion and trust 
- Training and education 
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Analytically, we raise the question whether these identified ways of promoting local 
resilience, and indeed understanding it, are acknowledged as relevant and if so, enacted, 
within the work and activities of CSOs FBOs in the Swedish setting? Below we present the 
results of our interview study, after first accounting for the methods used.   
 
Method 
 
Overall study design and sampling 
Our empirical data is based on 14 interviews, with 17 respondents (in two interviews 
we met with more than one representative) representing CSOs and FBOs on the national level 
and in two local contexts in Sweden. Eight of the respondents were men and nine were 
women. They either held important positions within their organizations or were project 
leaders. The two national Muslim FBOs are umbrella organizations that include about 25 000 
and 50 000 members respectively and between 30 and 50 congregations each (nationwide). 
Both receive funding from the Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities. 
In order to get a broad overview of our topic of interest, we chose to interview 
representatives for CSOs and FBOs working at both national and local levels. Our two local 
contexts were chosen to represent different contexts in the Swedish setting: one big city in the 
south of Sweden and one medium sized city in the north. Previous research has tended to 
focus exclusively on larger urban areas in the south of Sweden and we wanted to broaden that 
focus to identify a wider range of perceptions. Our sampling of participants (and thus 
organizations) was purposive and characterised by the snowballing technique. We used 
interviews with national and local public actors, starting with government agencies and local 
coordinators against violent extremism, as our point of departure. Such interviews are part of 
our larger project but not discussed and analysed in this paper. We asked representatives for 
government agencies to suggest relevant CSOs and FBOs and local coordinators to tell us 
about CSOs and FBOs that were part of local cooperation networks. We then contacted and 
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interviewed representatives and asked them to help us identify other relevant organizations, 
representatives and projects (Dahlgren, Emmelin & Winkvist, 2004). It turned out that the 
Church of Sweden and other Christian churches were often involved in such networks; 
Muslim FBOs and CSOs were not present to the same extent and were initially hard to reach. 
We relied on helpful individuals, some of whom were gatekeepers (we also ended up 
interviewing one of them) whose trust we had earned, and others who worked at government 
agencies trusted by the communities, to reach potential interviewees. Therefore, our empirical 
material should not be viewed as neither exhaustive nor representative for CSOs and FBOs in 
Sweden. Rather, our interviews should be seen as an “empirical mirroring”, of our literature 
review. Below is a summary and brief description of the type of organisation our interviewees 
represented: 
 
Type of CSO and FBO represented by our interviewees 
N=14 
National level Local level 
Christian FBOs (N=2) 
Muslim FBOs (N=2) 
Aid CSO (1) 
Civil defence CSO (N=1) 
Youth/cultural CSO (N=2)  
Cultural CSO (N=1) 
Gatekeeper with extensive experiences from 
various civil society organisations (N=1) 
Christian FBOs (N=2) 
Ethnic/Muslim CSOs (N=2) 
 
 
Data collection and analysis 
Our interviews were carried out in a flexible and pragmatic way, in order to adjust to 
the availability, wishes and needs of our interviewees. This implies that some interviews were 
carried out face to face while others were conducted by phone. Those carried out face to face 
were conducted at the place of preference of the interviewee, in their office, a conference 
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room at the university or at a public café. The interviews varied in length, from 30 minutes up 
to almost two hours. We used a semi structured interview guide, containing questions and 
topics to be covered during the interviews. These were; Questions about their organization, its 
aim and work; overall views and experiences of radicalization and violent extremism; 
perceptions about their organization’s role in preventing radicalization and violent extremism; 
views on local resilience, and experiences and perceptions about collaboration with other 
communities and actors. Some interviews were recorded while others were documented by 
extensive note taking. In addition, the responsible researcher wrote extensive memos after 
each interview. Recorded interviews were transcribed word by word, and interview notes 
were further developed and revised after each session. All available documentation from each 
interview was then combined and summarized. These documents were read and re-read 
several times to get a comprehensive picture of the material. In the next step of the analysis, 
we used the results from our previous literature review to summarize our findings. Thus, all 
interviews were summarized under the following pre-determined themes: 
 
- Views on their organisation’s role in preventing violent extremism 
- Ways of working/activities carried out within their organisation to; 
- strengthening social support networks;  
- collaborating with community organizations;  
- enhancing community resources; 
- increasing community safety;  
- building collective identity based on hope, agency, altruism, cohesion, trust and 
security;   
- training and education 
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Ethical considerations 
The study was approved by the regional ethics committee in Umeå (Dnr 2017/258-31). 
All respondents received oral and written information about the project. They were informed 
about the purpose of the study, that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw 
at any stage. We also provided information about how data would be treated and used and 
how confidentiality would be ensured. For some respondents, not least representatives for 
Muslim CSOs and FBOs, it was clear that the topic was sensitive. Several interviewees 
described how they, as individuals as well as members of their organisations, constantly felt 
stigmatised and regarded as suspect by the surrounding society as soon as radicalization and 
violent extremism were discussed. Thus, it was extremely important to clarify the purpose of 
our study and to try to build trust in the interview situation. Being flexible about how, when 
and where to carry out the interview was therefore also important. 
 
Perceptions of resilience building and prevention 
 
In this section, we present results and show that clear patterns emerge from the interviews: 
representatives for CSOs and FBOs generally define resilience in terms of social inclusion, 
participation, interpersonal and institutional trust and think that they contribute to resilience 
building in projects that aim to achieve all or some of that. They also think that much of the 
work they do and have done is preventive although not framed in that way. We show that 
there is considerable overlap in relation to how resilience is defined and said to be promoted 
in the reviewed literature; in the interviews, there is a strong emphasis on work to strengthen 
social support networks, enhance community resources and build collective identity.  
 
What is local resilience against radicalization and violent extremism?   
To begin with, local CSOs and FBOs did not unanimously agree that radicalization 
and violent extremism were problems (Muslim CSO 2; Christian FBO 6; Ethnic/Muslim CSO 
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3). They blamed the media for “using such words” and for stereotypical portraits of Muslims 
as radicalized and potential terrorists (Ethnic/Muslim CSO 3). One interviewee, who worked 
at a hospital, described how she was confronted by patients and asked to explain “what IS 
wants and why” (Ethnic/Muslim CSO 2). As a Muslim, she was expected not only to know all 
the intricacies and complexities of war and but violent conflict in the Middle East, but also 
expected to explain why her religion – so those who asked assumed – gave rise to ideas and 
behaviour of such a violent kind. National Muslim FBOs expressed in similar terms how they 
were fed up of being “researched, mapped, analysed, scrutinized and explained” by what they 
saw as an increasingly hostile community of Swedish researchers (Muslim FBO 4). “They 
think of us as part of the problem instead of part of the solution”, as one representative put it 
(Muslim FBO 4). 
However, it is also clear that experiences and observations of radicalization in local 
contexts vary. Where some saw no signs of radicalization and violent extremism, other 
interviewees described neighborhoods in which women and girls – due to the presence of a 
self-proclaimed morality police – were increasingly invisible in public spaces, and in which 
Islamist extremist ideas were propagated: “these are signs of radicalization to me” 
(Gatekeeper with extensive experience from various CSOs).  
Whether they observed signs of radicalization or not, local and national CSOs and 
FBOs generally thought of resilience and the role of their organizations and communities in 
similar terms. Resilience was about making people feel at home, about reaching out, about 
social inclusion and trust (Youth/cultural CSO 1; Youth/cultural CSO 4; Aid CSO 5; Cultural 
CSO 7; Christian FBO 1; Muslim FBO 3 and Muslim FBO 4). Resilience, as one 
representative said: “is about building a society where people not only feel accepted but feel 
at home” (Christian FBO 5). The overarching idea seemed to be that when people feel that 
they belong, are accepted for who they are and know that they can rely on community 
resources to help them navigate adversities, there is local resilience to radicalization and 
violent extremism. We expand on this in the next section but note that within these 
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perceptions of resilience, there is also a clear idea about why people are radicalized and drawn 
to violent extremist Islamism; it is because they lack a sense of context, meaning and 
belonging.  
 
What do CSOs and FBOs think is needed in order to promote local resilience? 
 
The importance of trust, networks and bridge building 
Some of the interviewed national and local CSOs did not think that violent extremism 
was really on their agenda but argued that the work they did to promote social inclusion in 
socioeconomically marginalized communities was linked to preventing radicalization 
(Youth/cultural CSO 1; Youth/cultural CSO 4; Aid CSO 5). It was striking that so many of 
the interviewed representatives stressed the ability of civil society to help increase 
interpersonal trust, which, so they argued, was linked to an increased trust in institutions: “our 
work is about increasing trust in institutions and authorities” (Youth/cultural CSO 1). A 
representative for a local project based in an area characterized by low socioeconomic status 
and inhabited mainly by a mix of immigrants and students argued: “Our ability to build trust 
is unique because we are already here, we know the languages people speak and are familiar 
with different cultural and religious practices” (Cultural CSO 7). The representative believed 
that such knowledge was key to being perceived as credible and genuine in efforts to 
“strengthen this entire community’s identity” (Cultural CSO 7). Strengthening identity meant 
creating places for people to meet, identifying common interests and doing meaningful things 
together. The latter included dance workshops, watching and discussing theatre and film, 
establishing a local café, organizing flea markets and making a web site on which people in 
the neighborhood could share ideas and initiatives. It also meant providing free activities – 
from sports to skate board building, pokébiking and trips – for children when schools were 
out for summer, Christmas or Easter. The whole point, the representative explained, was for 
people to get to know each other and build social and cultural networks (Cultural CSO 7). The 
  
 
 
 
 
Wimelius, Eriksson, Strandh & Ghazinour: Swedish civil society and faith based 
organizations in resilience building and prevention of radicalization and violent Islamist 
extremism 
 
 
 
 
139 
Spring 2020 
Nr. 22 
ISSN: 2363-9849          
entire project was also described as aiming for democracy-promotion, which was strongly 
believed to help prevent radicalization and violent extremism. The representative referred to 
the neighborhood as displaying “a strong religiosity without radicalism”, thought of religion 
as promoting social cohesion and providing people with places to meet (Cultural CSO 7).  
Another representative described how his organization often met with people who did 
not trust social workers or police officers: “some parents think that social workers are out to 
take their children away from them…the young think the police is racist” (Ethnic/Muslim 
CSO 3). These attitudes often led to a lack of interest in and will to cooperate with the social 
services and the police. This representative described it as a “huge task” to change such 
attitudes and perceptions, some of which stemmed from experiences of corrupt and dishonest 
state officials in other countries (Ethnic/Muslim CSO 3). 
 
A focus on resources and assets 
Christian FBOs described their work to build bridges, establish language cafés and 
reach out to people in immigrant communities, as ways to counter feelings of exclusion and 
alienation. The fact that FBOs are used to providing social, emotional and spiritual support to 
individuals and families in crisis was emphasized as an important resource (Christian FBO 5). 
One representative described how her organization had assisted people after the terrorist 
attack in Stockholm, “we were there offering social support, blankets and mobile chargers” 
(Christian FBO 1). 
Religion as such was also referred to as a resource and an asset in resilience building. 
Muslim FBOs described Islam as “containing boundaries and arguments that keep violent 
extremism at bay” (Muslim FBO 3). They also said that individuals who had joined IS or who 
had turned on their societies in hostile or violent ways had “lost Islam” (Muslim FBO 3; 
Muslim FBO 4). Imams and congregations were depicted as vital in their care and support for 
members and families but as one interviewee expressed it: “everything we do prevents 
extremism” (Muslim FBO 4). Democracy-promotion, social activities, football practice, 
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assisting with homework, parents walking the streets at night to keep them safe and the basic 
religious messages delivered during Friday prayer were all considered important and 
resilience building albeit not framed in that way. This interviewee wished that such activities 
would be acknowledged and understood in preventive terms and that society at large would 
realize that just because they were not labelled preventive, did not mean that Muslim FBOs 
did nothing. What was done on a daily basis should be regarded as part of a solution rather 
than part of a problem, the representative argued (Muslim FBO 4). 
 
The challenge of collaboration 
National and local CSOs and FBOs generally agreed that collaboration with public 
actors was essential but their experiences from collaboration varied. Christian and Muslim 
FBOs stressed that knowledge of religion among public actors, politicians and the public was 
poor: “society lacks words and concepts for understanding what religious faith is” (Christian 
FBO 1) one representative said; “most people do not know the difference between Sunni and 
Shi’a Islam”, another complained (Muslim FBO 3). This representative went on to argue that 
some government agencies seemed to be in the business of “scaring people all the time” by 
inventing images of Swedish society as under siege and constant threat from Islamist violent 
extremists (Muslim FBO 3). The representative called for “a logic and rational” take on 
current events (Muslim FBO 3). 
When asked about collaboration with public actors, one Muslim FBO representative 
plainly stated, “the congregations in my organization would tell you that they collaborate with 
Säpo [The Swedish Security Service] and that that is pretty much it” (Muslim FBO 4). This 
representative emphasized that many communities had called for local cooperation for a long 
time but were rarely invited to dialogue if they did not also bring a representative from the 
Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities: “There is low trust in us” (Muslim FBO 
4). Just being able to organize an event in a conference hall owned by a municipality had 
become increasingly difficult since local authorities were “afraid to let the wrong 
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communities in” (Muslim FBO 4). Frustration showed as this representative continued to 
describe what was experienced as a state of ongoing and relentless public, political and media 
led audit of Muslim CSOs and FBOs that received state funding. “We comply with all the 
rules, what else, or what more do we need to do in order to pass inspection?” (Muslim FBO 
4). Adding to that, another difficulty pertaining to work done by CSOs and FBOs was said to 
be that a lot was expected from short-term project-based work. One interviewee simply stated 
that time (often only about a year) was too short for projects to be able to deliver results that 
were “long-term”, which was asked for by funders (Cultural CSO 7). 
Others worried that state funding would end altogether and drastically undercut the 
ability of Muslim CSOs and FBOs to do resilience building and preventive work. The state 
should not, so a Muslim CSO representative argued, back down from demanding explicit 
compliance with democratic norms, but also invest more in cooperation with Muslim CSOs 
and FBOs in order not to “lose an entire group” (Ethnic/Muslim CSO 3). Yet others, notably 
well-established Swedish CSOs and Christian FBOs, had good experiences of collaboration 
and cooperation. They were invited to and took part in formal cooperation networks centered 
on issues that also touched upon radicalization and violent extremism. They were quite used 
to being consulted and appreciated for what they did. What was described in interviews were 
meetings with – among others – local police, social services, schools, businesses, and property 
owners (Cultural CSO 7). A local representative for the Church of Sweden described that he 
had been invited – to represent all faith based organizations – to sit on a regional committee 
on crisis preparedness issues. The committee is led by the County Administration Board and 
includes the rescue services, the coast guard, the police and the regional branch of the 
Security Service. Radicalization and violent extremism were agreed to be “among the most 
important” of issues but the representative found the committee was not able to “do 
something concretely” but assumed that the Security Service did keep an eye on things but 
could not share this with the rest of the committee (Christian FBO 6). However, resilience and 
prevention, so this representative thought, went beyond security related work. Again, bridge 
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building, inclusion and participation were articulated as pivotal. Interestingly, this 
representative argued that Christian FBOs could help local authorities approach local Muslim 
FBOs. Contacts needed to be “less dramatic” and the church could very well help to “break 
the ice” and find ways in which cooperation could be initiated by assuming a facilitator-like 
role (Christian FBO 6). An arena on which Christian FBOs (in this local context) could strive 
to accomplish this was an interreligious council, initiated by the local government a couple of 
years ago. The council meets four times a year and includes representatives for religious 
minorities in Sweden. Its purpose is to increase mutual understanding, promote interreligious 
cooperation, dialogue and communication. According to the representative, meetings were 
good venues for getting to know each other and build trust between communities on the one 
hand and communities and the local government on the other (Christian FBO 6).  
To sum up, not only do CSOs and FBOs – national and local, Christian, Muslim and 
secular – think of resilience in similar terms. Those interviewed here seemed to agree that one 
of the major (and perhaps unique) strengths of civil society is the ability to build and foster 
trust between communities and individuals and trust in institutions. It is telling that so many 
of them describe activities in terms of building bridges and increasing mutual acceptance. 
What also stands out is the view that resilience to radicalization and violent extremism might 
be better built by civil society actors if they are allowed to continue doing what they always 
have done, rather than by designing specific projects aimed at preventing radicalization and 
violent extremism. It is also clear that many of the factors identified in the literature review of 
resilience feature in the interviews. Strengthening social support networks and enhancing 
community resources are perhaps the two most obvious ones, but building collective identity 
is also prominent. Training and education did not feature to the same extent. Collaboration 
was seen as vital but also as imbued with difficulties, especially for Muslim CSOs and FBOs 
who experienced that there was “low trust” in them among other actors. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Wimelius, Eriksson, Strandh & Ghazinour: Swedish civil society and faith based 
organizations in resilience building and prevention of radicalization and violent Islamist 
extremism 
 
 
 
 
143 
Spring 2020 
Nr. 22 
ISSN: 2363-9849          
Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have explored and analysed how purposely selected representatives for 
Swedish CSOs and FBOs perceive their role in resilience building and preventive work. We 
have asked what they think local resilience against radicalization and violent extremism is, 
and what they think must be done in order to promote it. Our interviews show that CSOs and 
FBOs think that they build resilience and help prevent radicalization and violent extremism 
when they do what their organizations are geared up to do – reach out to people, promote 
participation in social life, engage people in each other and in the future of their 
neighborhoods and build trust. We interpret their understanding of local resilience as that of a 
safety net, a web of relationships that catch you if you fall, help you get a foothold in a new 
society and gives you a sense of belonging. Across geographical space and irrespective of the 
basis for their activities (aid, religion, culture or civil defence), the interviewed representatives 
shared this understanding of what local resilience is but tended to emphasize different 
resources in resilience building. For Christian and Muslim FBOs for instance, religion was a 
resource; churches and mosques allow people to meet and connect and religious communities 
contribute to social cohesion.  
This study was based on a relatively small number of interviews. Even if the purpose 
here was not representative sampling, there is a clear need for future research to expand the 
horizon. As described earlier, CSOs, FBOs and local authorities nationwide are engaged in 
projects, programs and initiatives that address and prevent violent extremism; these are well 
worth studying. Local cooperation networks, involving both public actors and representatives 
for CSOs and FBOs, also merit more attention. In this paper, we have been able to describe 
(some) CSO and FBO experiences of collaboration, but what do public actors think, what are 
their experiences? We also want to stress that the two national Muslim FBOs included in this 
paper are umbrella organizations. They have thousands of members and include between 30 
and 50 congregations; more interviews are called for and our results must be interpreted with 
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that in mind. Nonetheless, we argue that what emerges from our interviews not only matches 
up with results from other studies, but also displays strong similarities with findings from the 
literature review.  
First, it is striking how similar experiences of Swedish CSOs and FBOs are to those of 
counterparts in other countries (see Cortright et al, 2008; Sumpter, 2017; Said & Fouad, 
2018). Contexts differ but the opinion and experience that some of the best resilience building 
work is done within the realms of regular and ordinary activities rather than ones especially 
and explicitly designed to prevent violent extremism, is something they have in common. 
Swedish Muslim FBOs also experienced some of the same difficulties related to collaboration 
with public actors that Muslim FBOs elsewhere do. They were not necessarily invited to 
dialogue or local networks and thought this was so because there was an underlying suspicion 
that they were hiding, hostile and undemocratic agendas (see Said & Fouad, 2018). In this 
perspective, it is quite revealing how one representative stated that most congregations would 
name the Security Service, if asked with whom they usually collaborated. The representatives 
interviewed in this study felt they were under constant scrutiny and audit and that no matter 
what they did, they never really passed the test. In their view, the resources they possess and 
provide remain to a considerable extent untapped by society. It is telling that Christian FBOs 
also observed this and thought of themselves as potential liaisons between Muslim FBOs on 
the one hand and local government officials on the other. This scrutiny is probably linked to 
the exposure of a network of Salafi imams who seem to be in the business of preaching not 
only isolation from Swedish society, but have praised IS and championed ideas that are 
clearly detrimental to gender equality and are anti-democratic, homophobic and anti-Semitic 
(Ranstorp, Ahlin, Hyllengren & Normark, 2018). Some of the people associated with these 
imams have made names for themselves as youth leaders and helped initiate and establish for 
instance sports clubs (Ranstorp et al 2018, 113 ff; 143 ff, 165 ff). For critics, it is their 
activities that define what Muslim CSOs and FBOs do; distinctions between this network and 
its associates and other organizations are hard to make in a debate that allows for few 
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nuances. For Muslim CSOs and FBOs who do not endorse or sympathize with this Salafi 
network, it is consequently an uphill battle. The debate on state funding and the role of CSOs 
and FBOs in preventive work is a necessary one but the risk is that it ends up constraining and 
undercutting the work of organizations and communities that do not wish to partake in 
strategies of isolation or subscribe to illiberal and deeply anti-democratic ideas.  
Second, when mirrored against our literature review on what local resilience to 
radicalisation is and how it can be promoted, findings show that recurrent themes in the 
literature review also emerge in the interviews. In both, the underlying assumption is that 
CSOs and FBOs can offer individuals who risk being drawn to extremist groups a much 
needed and positive alternative. This assumption is in turn based on the premise that it is lack 
of social context, meaning and community that together with a wide range of other individual 
or societal triggers explain radicalization. In the interviews, the emphasis on social networks, 
community resources, and collective identity stand out. Representatives for CSOs and FBOs 
kept stressing the importance of belonging and the importance of building bridges between 
individuals, communities and the surrounding society to avoid social exclusion and 
segregation. In their view, a basic component of local resilience seemed to be bridging social 
capital, that is building networks between diverse people and promoting understanding and 
cooperation between people with different social and ethnic backgrounds. This is also 
described as a key resource in literature and research on local resilience. Some definitions of 
the latter even include the former meaning that local or community resilience is ”social 
capital, physical infrastructure, and culturally embedded patterns of interdependence” (Ungar, 
2011: 1742, cf. Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack 2016 and Weine, 2012).  
Finally, our findings should be discussed also from a broader perspective and one that 
reflects the most recent developments in Sweden. Efforts to fight radicalization in terms of 
counter terrorism and countering violent extremism strategies have increasingly been, if not 
replaced, than at least complemented by an emphasis put on resilience and prevention in many 
countries (Aly et al, 2015), Sweden included. Not only has it become important to distinguish 
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(analytically as well as in policy terms) between radicalization, violent extremism and 
terrorism; there is growing consensus that explanations to why people radicalize are complex 
– there are no handy, catch all generalizations or quick fixes waiting to be made and 
implemented. However, local actors are still expected to do something, to be prepared, to help 
promote local resilience and prevent radicalization and violent extremism. In terms of doing 
something, protection, seen from a social policy perspective, has traditionally been strong in 
Sweden. However, and as observed in previous research, there is tension between such an 
approach and a security oriented one in Swedish local action plans against radicalization and 
violent extremism. This tension is also present on the national level and the political debate 
has been moving back and forth between these two perspectives over the last couple of years. 
It was therefore interesting that the national coordinator against violent extremism was 
replaced by the Center for Preventing Violent Extremism (CVE) on January 1, 2018. The 
CVE, which operates under the auspices of the Swedish National Council for Crime 
Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet, Brå), shall “based primarily on crime policy grounds, 
strengthen and develop preventive work against violent extremism. The primary aim of the 
center is to prevent ideologically motivated criminality and terrorism in Sweden.” (CVE, 
2018).  
On the one hand, the establishment of the CVE could be interpreted as a return to 
counter terrorism strategies, implying a less significant emphasis on the role of civil society in 
preventive work. On the other, local prevention and resilience are still explicit priorities in 
Sweden and cooperation is continually emphasized as critically important for effective and 
successful prevention. In a report from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and 
Regions (Sveriges kommuner och landsting, SKL), it says that: “Municipalities should lead 
local preventive work and cooperate with schools, police and social services, faith based 
communities and civil society within the framework of existing collaborative structures” 
(SKL, 2019: 6). The report goes on to stress that young peoples’ resilience to extremist ideas 
and messages must be strengthened through supportive work done in schools and by the 
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social services in cooperation with a wide range of other actors, including CSOs and FBOs 
(SKL, 2019: 7). Taken together, these developments could be interpreted as attempts to strike 
a better balance between social and security policy in Sweden. Since explanations to 
radicalization and violent extremism are complex, identifying and promoting general 
protective factors – and inviting CSOs and FBOs to participate in those efforts – is a good 
option on the local level. However, it is also an option that does not preclude the Security 
Services and the Police from narrowing in on crime and terrorism. When actors are allowed to 
do what they do best, the number of resources and strengths brought to cooperation and 
collaboration networks are likely to increase and can be synthesized in constructive and 
“smart” (see Aly et al, 2015) ways. For that to happen though, CSOs and FBOs that adhere to 
democratic norms must be perceived as part of the solution rather than part of the problem. 
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